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Abstract:  In this paper we investigate the effect of relative income on marital status.  We 
develop an identity model based on Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and apply it to the 
marriage decision.  The empirical evidence is consistent with the idea that people are 
more likely to marry when their incomes approach a financial level associated with 
idealized norms of marriage.  We hypothesize that the “marriage ideal” is determined by 
the median income in an individual’s local reference group.  After controlling flexibly for 
the absolute level of income and a number of other factors, the ratio between a man’s 
income and the marriage ideal is a strong predictor of marital status – but only if he is 
below the ideal.  For white men, relative income considerations jointly drive co-
residence, marriage, and fatherhood decisions. For black men, relative income affects the 
marriage decision only, and relative income is tied to marital status even for those living 
with a partner and children.  Relative income concerns explain 10-15 percent of the 
decline in marriage since 1970 for low income white men, and account for more than half 
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Marriage Meets the Joneses: 
Relative Income, Identity, and Marital Status 
 
It is well known that low-income men are less likely to marry.  Among 25-34-year-old 
white men in the 2000 Census, for example, 34 percent of those in the bottom quarter of 
the income distribution are married, compared with 67 percent of those in the top quarter 
of the income distribution.  For blacks, the numbers are 16 percent and 50 percent 
respectively.
1  A number of social and economic explanations for this phenomenon have 
been proposed, many focusing on the role of economic security in determining whether a 
man is “marriageable.”  Here, we explore the possibility that relative income is an 
important determinant of the marriage decision.   We build on Easterlin’s (1980) 
suggestion that income relative to aspirations affects marriage and childbearing.    
 
Our theoretical framework borrows heavily from Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) model of 
identity.  We hypothesize that people marry in part to gain utility from thinking of 
themselves in the category of “married people.”  This category entails certain 
prescriptions for behavior and characteristics, including a particular standard of living 
associated with marriage.  When couples are far from achieving this norm, they benefit 
less from marrying, and therefore are less likely to do so.   We hypothesize that the 
income associated with an ideal marriage is not absolute, but differs depending on a 
couple’s reference group.  Empirically, we explore reference groups determined by 
metropolitan area, race, and education. 
 
This paper contributes to a growing literature which attempts to isolate the causal 
influence of relative income on a diverse set of behaviors and outcomes.  Recent and 
historic work has explored the link between relative income and subjective well-being 
(Clark et al (2008), Luttmer (2005), and others), health outcomes and health behaviors 
(Miller and Paxson (2006), Eibner and Evans (2005), and others), female labor supply 
                                                 
1 These figures exclude men living in group quarters.  Married refers to currently married and living with a 
spouse.  White men are native-born non-Hispanic white men; black men are native-born non-Hispanic 
black men.  The analysis to follow is restricted to those residing in sample metropolitan areas; marriage 
rates for the sample exhibit similar disparities between high- and low-income men.   3
(Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998)), consumption and savings (Denizer et al, 2000, 
Kosicki, 1987, Duesenberry, 1949), homeownership (Withers, 1998), suicide (Daly, 
Wilson, and Johnson, 2007), social capital (Fischer and Torgler, 2006), and even soccer 
performance (Torgler and Schmidt, 2007).   
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section I discusses the link between income and 
marriage.  In Section II, we develop a simple theoretical framework which incorporates 
the notion of identity to the marriage decision.   We then offer a descriptive analysis of 
marriage patterns across metropolitan areas in Section III.  Section IV describes the data 
and empirical strategy, and section V reports results.  Section VI presents the results of 
simulations that assess the importance of relative income in explaining declining rates of 




I.  Income and Marriage 
Figures 1a, 1b and 1c illustrate two stylized facts.  First, there is a strong positive 
relationship between a man’s income and marital status in the U.S. in each Census year 
between 1950 and 2000.  The correlation is strongest at the bottom of the income 
distribution but weakens for men at the top of the distribution.  Second, at each level of 
income, marriage rates have fallen in every decade since 1960.
2   Declines in the 
probability of being married are particularly evident between 1970 and 1990 for all three 
groups of young men studied – native non-Hispanic white, native non-Hispanic black, 
and native Hispanic men.   
 
Our main analysis focuses on the years 1980-2000.  During that period, there was a 
roughly 15 percentage point decline in marriage for young white men across the income 
distribution (see Table 1).  Declines for black men were 11 to 18 percentage points and 
greatest in the second quartile of the income distribution.  Table 1 indicates that these 
                                                 
2 The probability of being married at any given income level is similar in 1950 and 1960.  However, as is 
evident from Table 1, there was a rise in the overall likelihood of being married between 1950 and 1960 
associated with rising incomes.    4
changes represent a larger percentage change in marriage at the bottom of the income 
distribution for all groups.   In the bottom quartile of 25-to-34 year old white men, for 
example, about 49 percent of men were married in 1980 and only 34 percent were 
married in 2000.
3   The decline was from 27 to 16 percent for black men and from 48 to 
24 percent for Hispanic men.   
 
Why do declines in marriage matter?  Although it is difficult to separate the selection into 
marriage from its causal influence, marriage is associated with a wide range of beneficial 
outcomes for the married individuals, their children, and society more broadly.  Marriage 
promotion is also a key underpinning of recent anti-poverty efforts.  The 1996 welfare 
reform (PWRORA) controversially emphasized marriage as a means to ending welfare 
dependency, and policy efforts to strengthen marriage have continued since that time 
(Lerman, 2002).   Understanding why couples, and particularly low-income couples, 
choose to marry or not marry is therefore of heightened policy interest. 
 
As noted in a recent review article by Burstein (2007), economic models suggest reasons 
why the poor might be either more or less likely to marry.  The classic economic model 
of marriage posited by Becker (1981) hinges on specialization in home production. The 
gains from specialization and public goods (Lam, 1988) might be particularly important 
to a disadvantaged couple.  On the other hand, if men’s earnings are low relative to 
women’s at the bottom of the distribution, the gains from specialization are muted and 
marriage becomes less likely among disadvantaged couples.  Furthermore, tax policy and 
means-tested social insurance programs may discourage marriage, and the disincentives 
might be particularly pronounced at the bottom of the income distribution.
4 
 
The structure of marriage markets also plays a potentially important role in discouraging 
marriage at the bottom of the income distribution.  Loughran (2002) and Gould and 
Paserman (2003) document the negative effect of rising male income inequality on 
                                                 
3 Figures exclude men living in group quarters.  Numbers are similar in our sample of metropolitan men. 
4 Burstein (2007) includes a review of the empirical literature on the relationship between marriage and tax 
and transfer policy.  While the tax code and transfer policy generate significant marriage penalties and 
subsidies for some couples, the evidence generally indicates small effects of these incentives on marriage 
decisions.   5
marriage rates, arguing that income dispersion extends the female search process.  Willis 
(1999) posits that uneven sex ratios and adequate support for single mothers can lead to 
an equilibrium in which low-income men remain unmarried and father children with 
multiple partners. 
 
The economic models of specialization and marriage markets suggest that low-income 
men may be less likely to form stable co-residential partnerships.  However, economic 
theory is largely silent on how income affects the decision to marry once such 
partnerships are formed.
5   Unmarried cohabitation is an increasingly common status; in 
the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth 50 percent of women aged 15 to 44 had 
cohabited at some point and 59 percent of marriages were preceded by cohabitation 
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007).  A large majority of cohabiters expect or hope to marry 
(Lichter, 2006).  Still, a majority of cohabiting unions do not transition to marriage in five 
years, either because of dissolution or inertia.  More than a fifth of cohabiting couples in 
2002 had been living together at least five years (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007).  These 
facts imply that barriers to marriage exist among co-residing couples. 
 
Qualitative work by Gibson-Davis, Edin, and McLanahan (2005) suggests that financial 
status affects the marriage decision even among co-residing couples with children.
6  
Although all of the couples in the Gibson-Davis et al. study have young children together 
and a majority co-reside, many opt to postpone marriage for financial reasons.   
Respondents repeatedly point to markers of a middle class lifestyle as pre-requisites for 
marriage, though the perceived necessities vary across individuals.
7  In many cases, 
because the stated financial goals are unlikely to be attainable, the high financial 
expectations associated with marriage are likely to preclude marriage for the foreseeable 
future.  The notion that couples perceive financial security as a pre-requisite to marriage, 
                                                 
5 Because tax and transfer policy are sensitive to marital status per se, such policy might influence whether 
co-residential partners marry.  In the analysis, we control for state AFDC generosity and include year fixed 
effects to account for national changes in tax policy.   
6 We describe couples sharing a household as co-residing whether married or unmarried; we refer to 
unmarried co-residing couples as cohabiting. 
7 Examples include a washer-dryer, a single-family house with a garage, a couples “own place”, a car, and a 
big wedding.  We suspect that the financial level viewed as necessary for marriage depends on an 
individual’s reference group.   6
even after choosing to live and bear children together, suggests that existing economic 
models offer an incomplete picture of the marriage decision.  
 
Here we invoke the concept of identity developed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) to 
explain the puzzle.  The decision of a couple to marry once a co-residential partnership 
has been formed is largely the decision to identify publicly and privately as a married 
couple.  The Gibson-Davis et al. study suggests that marriage is associated with a set of 
prescriptions (norms) for behavior and financial status. Without the financial wherewithal 
to meet these expectations, cohabitation is preferable to marriage.  One couple in the 
study, for example, is embarrassed to publicly acknowledge their marriage because they 
lack financial independence and still live at home.  Translated into the Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000) identity framework, a couple failing to achieve the financial prescriptions 
associated with marriage suffers a utility loss if they choose to enter the category of 
married people. 
 
The notion that marriage is associated with the realization of financial norms is not new.  
Easterlin (1980) posits that couples aspire to a certain standard of living before marrying.  
Wilson (1987), Oppenheimer, Kalmjin, and Lim (1997), and Brown and Kesselring 
(2003) argue that male “marriageability” is contingent on steady employment or a 
minimum level of earnings.  Qualitative work by Edin (2000) and Gibson-Davis, Edin, 
and McLanahan (2005) also points to the importance of financial stability as a precursor 
to marriage.   
 
Less clear is how such financial prescriptions are determined.  Easterlin (1980) suggests 
that financial aspirations stem from the standard of living one experienced as a young 
adult.  But the Gibson-Davis et al. respondents appear to reference a set of norms 
extending beyond their own life experiences.  Here we analyze local reference groups - 
for example, those comprised of others in one’s own metropolitan area, race/ethnicity, 
and/or education category.  We are guided by the theme of a “middle class lifestyle” that 
runs throughout the Gibson-Davis et al study;  we assume that the ideal income targeted 
by men is that of the median fully employed man in his reference group.  However, we   7
also explore how the theoretical middle class marriage ideal compares to empirically 
“estimated ideals” which are generated based on marriage patterns in the data. 
 
Our theoretical framework abstracts from marriage market considerations and the search 
process.  Empirically, we address the marriage market issue in two ways. First, in the 
main analysis, we control for race/ethnicity-specific sex ratios in the metropolitan area 
and a man’s rank in the local race/ethnicity-specific income distribution.  Second, we 
replicate the main analysis restricting the sample to those men already living with a 
partner. We expect marriage market search considerations to be considerably dampened 
for co-residing men.       
 
II. A Model of Income, Identity, and Marriage 
Suppose a locality has an equal number of men and women in the marriage market.  Each 
person is endowed with income drawn from the same distribution.  Suppose further that 
the desirability of men and women is represented by their income i Y .  We abstract from 
the matching process and assume men and women are matched by the level of income 
such that within each couple the man and the woman have equal levels of income.  The 
couples may decide to cohabit or marry.  The value of marrying is determined by 
background characteristics (such as age, education, race, income, characteristics of peers) 
which in turn affect the financial returns and personal returns to marriage.  For example, 
married couples might receive financial benefits or incur costs because of tax and welfare 
policies that interact with their level of income.  The personal returns include social 
rewards for marriage from family and friends as well as the effect of marrying on one’s 
self-image.     
 
Following the model of identity outlined in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), we describe 
“married people” as one group c in a set of social categories C with which men and 
women may choose to identify.  Prescriptions P describe the ideal characteristics and 
behavior for each category.  For example, married people might be expected to have a 
high level of income, to live in their own residence apart from extended family, to stay   8
home instead of going to the bar, and to exhibit high levels of paternal involvement in 
childrearing.   
 
We assume the category “cohabiting people” has no set of prescriptions.  While this is a 
simplification, the financial hurdle for cohabitation is likely to be much lower than that 
for marriage.  In a study of the relationship between education, marriage and 
cohabitiation, Thorton, Axinn, and Teachman (1995) posit that schooling and the 
associated earning power may be less important for cohabitation than for marriage.  The 
qualitative evidence from Gibson-Davis, Edin, and McLanahan (2005) also suggests that 
cohabitation involves weaker financial prescriptions; many respondents already lived 
together but viewed their economic situation as inadequate for marriage.   
 
An individual’s self-image  i I  depends on the match between his or her behavior and 
characteristics with the ideals prescribed for his or her category.  In our simple model, we 
focus on the prescription that married people have a certain level of income.  We also 
allow a random error term  i ε  with mean zero to affect an individual’s self image 
associated with any given category. Thus, an individual’s utility can be described by: 
(, ) ii i i UU Y I =  
where  Ii=Ii (Yi, ci, P, εic) , 
/0 ii UY ∂ ∂ ; , and 
/0 ii UI ∂ ∂ ;  
That is, in general an individual’s utility depends on his income and self-image.  Self-
image, in turn, is a function of interactions between an individual’s income, the category 
with which he identifies, the prescriptions for that category, and a random error term.   
 
Suppose that the financial prescription for a married person is at least  ideal Y , where  ideal Y  is 
the median income of a given reference group.  The identity payoff for a married person 
is then: 
m I( m a x ( 0 , 1 ) )
i





ε =− − +,   9
where t is a positive scalar describing the identity loss associated with falling below the 
“marriage ideal”.  The identity payoff for cohabiting is:  
I i cohab icohab I ε = +  
and we assume  m II ar cohab ; .  In other words, on average a married person meeting the 
ideal has a higher self-image than a cohabiting person. 
 
In making the decision whether to marry, an individual compares the utility from 
cohabiting and marriage.  The self-image gained through marriage (relative to 
cohabitation) is  
m (I ) (max(0,1 )) ( )
i





εε =− − − + −  
The gains to self-image through marriage tend to increase with the average gain in self-
image from marriage and an individual’s income.   The gains decrease with a higher 
“marriage ideal” and a higher penalty t for deviating from the norm.   
 
This framework provides some simple comparative statics.  The gain to marriage is 















.   
Similarly, an increase in the marriage ideal  ideal Y  is associated with a decrease in the gain 
to marriage for low values of Yi but no change in the gain for high values of Yi.  A higher 
level of t strengthens the relationship between Yi and marriage below the marriage ideal, 
and reduces the overall marriage rate holding other factors constant.   
 
The model assumes that  ideal Y  is the median income of a relevant reference group.  We 
follow this approach in the empirical work, defining reference groups to consist of fully 
employed working age men in the same metropolitan area, race/ethnicity group, and/or 
education group as the individual.  In the next section, we examine marriage patterns in 
the data.  We also generate “estimated ideals” from the data and compare them to the 
theoretical “middle class” ideal of the reference group median.   
   10
III.  Estimated and Theoretical Marriage Ideals 
Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c demonstrate a positive relationship between marriage and income 
at the national level for men ages 25 to 34.  The relationship is strongest at the bottom of 
the income distribution and weaker at the top of the income distribution.  These pictures, 
however, combine men in many metropolitan areas who are likely to have different 
reference groups and, according to our theoretical framework, different perceptions of the 
level income required for marriage.  If reference groups are formed at the metropolitan 
area level, the model predicts a significant flattening in the relationship between income 
and marriage within each metropolitan area.   
 
We visually examine the income-marriage relationship within each metropolitan area, 
year and race/ethnicity group.  Examples of these relationships for white men in selected 
metropolitan areas are shown in Figure 2.  The graphs suggest that, in the white sample, 
the flattening of the income-marriage relationship is evident within most metropolitan 
areas and that the apparent point of flattening differs across metropolitan areas.
8  
 
To describe the income-marriage relationship in each metropolitan area, we consider the 
following equation: 
01 2 3 Pr( ) * *( * ) * ii i i mar Y Y highinc highinc α αα α ε =+ + + + , 
where Yi is an individual i’s income, highinc is an indicator that Yi exceeds some value j.  
In estimating this descriptive model, a significant negative value for  2 α  indicates a 
flattening of the income-marriage relationship around point j.   We run this regression 
multiple times for each metropolitan area and year and race/ethnicity group in our sample 
using a linear probability model, searching across potential values of j.
9  Among values of 
j which yield statistically significant negative values of  2 α , we choose the one generating 
the regression model with the highest R-squared.  The selected value of j represents the 
                                                 
8 The pattern of flattening is less evident in the black sample, as discussed below. 
9 Potential values of j are restricted to those between the 20
th and 80
th percentile of income of fully 
employed men in the metropolitan area, year, and race group, and searched over $500 increments.   11
point at which the relationship between income and marriage flattens in the data; we refer 
to it as the “estimated ideal.”
10   
 
There is a positive relationship between income and marriage for low-income men within 
all metropolitan areas.   For the white male sample, there is at least one significant 
negative slope change in the relevant range for 319 of 330 metropolitan area-year cells – 
that is, there is a point of flattening of the income-marriage relationship.   The “estimated 
ideal” is shown as a dashed line for five large metropolitan areas in Figure 2.  Figure 2 
also includes solid lines representing theoretical “middle class” ideals – the median 
income of fully employed men in the reference group for each metropolitan area and 
year.   
 
Means of the estimated ideals for men in the sample are shown in Table 2.   The values of 
the ideals vary substantially across metropolitan areas.  For about half of men in the white 
sample, the estimated ideal falls between the 40th and the 60th percentile of the earnings 
distribution of fully employed working aged men.
11   Figure 3 illustrates the correlation 
between the estimated ideal and the theoretical middle class ideal (median earnings of 
fully employed men) across metropolitan areas in the white male sample.  The estimated 
marriage ideal is higher in high-income areas.   
 
Table 3 presents regression analysis exploring the link between the estimated ideal and 
the theoretical middle class ideal.  Results indicate that the estimated ideal is closely tied 
to the theoretical ideal, both across metropolitan areas in any given year and within 
metropolitan areas over time.  A 1 percent increase in median earnings of fully employed 
men is associated with a 1 to 1.7 percent increase in the estimated ideal, after controlling 
for metropolitan area fixed effects and other metropolitan area characteristics.  
 
                                                 
10 This procedure is similar to one used in Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) to identify neighborhood 
tipping points in metropolitan areas. 
11 By construction, the estimated ideal falls between the 20
th and 80
th percentile of the income of fully 
employed men in the metropolitan area and race/ethnicity group.  For black men, the estimated ideal varies 
widely; it falls between the 40
th and 60
th percentiles less than a third of the time.   12
The pattern of flattening in the income-marriage relationship is less evident in the black 
sample.  Unlike in the white sample, marital status and income are positively related 
throughout the income distribution for black men in many metropolitan areas.  In 57 out 
of 255 metropolitan area-year cells, there is no statistically significant flattening of the 
relationship in the relevant range.
12  Estimated ideals vary widely and are not 
significantly related to median earnings except in the 1980 cross-section (see Table 3).
13    
The analysis that follows also indicates that models using the race/ethnicity specific 
reference group do not perform well for the black male sample.  Rather, education-
specific reference groups generate results that are consistent with the theoretical 
framework for black men.   
 
Although there is a point at which the income-marriage relationship flattens in almost all 
metropolitan areas for white men (and in many metropolitan areas for black and Hispanic 
men), there are limitations to using the “estimated ideal” in the formal analysis to follow.  
First, these ideals are chosen to fit the predictions of the model.  It is therefore 
inappropriate to use them to test the validity of the model.  Second, the “estimated ideals” 
are sensitive to outliers in the data.   
 
Instead, we rely on a different proxy for the marriage ideal.  The level of income 
perceived to be required for marriage is unobservable and presumably differs across 
individuals.  In the analysis that follows, we use the median income in a local reference 
group (which we refer to as the theoretical middle class ideal) as a proxy for the marriage 
ideal.  The qualitative evidence described by Gibson-Davis et al. suggests that low-
income men aspire to a middle class lifestyle prior to marriage, which we define as the 
median earnings of a fully employed (full-time full-year) man in the relevant reference 
group.  We consider the median income of (1) full employed (full-time full-year) male 
workers in one’s metropolitan area and race/ethnicity group, and (2) fully employed male 
                                                 
12 The relevant range is the 20
th through 80
th income percentile of fully employed black men in the 
metropolitan area and year. 
13 For the Hispanic sample, there is no significant flattening in 37 of 121 metropolitan area-year cells, 
particularly in those cells with small sample sizes.  Estimated ideals are noisy for the Hispanic sample.     13
workers in one’s metropolitan area and education group, and (3) fully employed male 
workers in one’s metropolitan area, education group and race/ethnicity group.   
 
The mean values of the theoretical middle class ideals are reported in Table 2.  Because 
the ideal is determined by fully employed adult men of all ages, the income associated 
with the marriage ideal is higher than that of the median man in the sample; 66-93 
percent of men fall below the ideal depending on the sample, year, and reference group.  
The values of the ideals stay fairly constant over time for the white and black samples 
and fall for the Hispanic samples.
14  Due to rising inequality, the ratio of income to the 
ideal is declining for those below the ideal but increasing for those above the ideal.  
Couples below the ideal are farther from it, and couples above the ideal increasingly 
exceed it.  For both the white and Hispanic samples, this pattern is evident using all three 
reference groups with both the one-earner and two-earner methodologies.  For the black 
sample, relative incomes for those below the ideal fell in the 1980s but recovered in the 
1990s. 
  
We focus on how male income compares to a male earnings in the reference group.  
Although couples presumably consider their joint potential income when making the 
marriage decision, female income is unobservable for many men in our sample.   
Furthermore, female labor supply is endogenous to the marriage decision. Nevertheless, 
we also experiment with allowing the “marriage ideal” to be a function of estimated 
potential earnings of two earners.  The two-earner analysis is discussed in the appendix.  
Results are fairly similar using the one-earner and two-earner approaches.  
 
IV. Data and Empirical Strategy 
We use the 5% IPUMS sample of the 1980-2000 U.S. Censuses to investigate the 
determinants of marriage.  We limit our analysis to residents of 110 metropolitan areas 
for which we have housing price data; the metropolitan areas are matched to be as 
                                                 
14 As discussed in the appendix, the two-earner estimated ideals generally increase over time, consistent 
with increased earnings power for women over the time period.   14
geographically consistent as possible across three sample years.
15  We use samples for 
three demographic groups:  native born non-Hispanic white men ages 25-34, native born 
non-Hispanic black men, and native born Hispanic men ages 25-34.
16  We choose ages 
25-34 so that respondents are likely to have completed school and are observed at a point 
likely to be close to the timing of their marriage decision.  We exclude the foreign born 
population because some of these individuals may derive norms and expectations about 
marriage from their home countries. 
 
A limitation of the Census sample is that it is a repeated cross-section rather than a panel.  
Therefore, we cannot evaluate how the exact timing of the marriage decision relates to 
the income trajectory for an individual.  However, we believe that this disadvantage is 
outweighed by the very large sample sizes; there are over one million 25-34-year-old 
men in the non-Hispanic white sample.  The large samples allow us to precisely estimate 
the effects of relative income on marital status while controlling very flexibly for 
absolute income and a number of other potential confounders.    
 
We use reported total real income last year for each man in the Census sample as a proxy 
for his earnings at the time of the marriage decision.  Income is top-coded and bottom-
coded in the public use data.  To minimize the effect of top- and bottom-coding, and to 
exclude non-positive reported incomes, we drop men in the top and bottom 5 percent of 
each metropolitan area’s income distribution in each year.  In the samples of black and 
Hispanic men, we exclude the top and bottom 10 percent. 
 
As noted above, our main analysis assumes that the male in the relationship aspires to the 
median income of a fully employed (full-time full-year) man within a particular reference 
group.  Models incorporating the potential earnings of women are discussed in the 
appendix.  Throughout the analysis, reference groups are assumed to operate within 
metropolitan areas.  Norms that are perpetuated at a national level (for example, through 
                                                 
15 Thanks to Lara Shore-Sheppard for sharing the metropolitan area match. 
16 To be included in the sample, a metropolitan area must have at least 100 18-to-64 year-old men in the 
race/ethnicity group in the PUMS for all three Census years.  This ensures that the values of the marriage 
ideal are reliably estimated.  The restriction results in 85 metropolitan areas for the native non-Hispanic 
black sample and 47 metropolitan areas for the native Hispanic sample.   15
television) are not identified here.  Within metropolitan areas, we explore reference 
groups determined by race and/or education.   
 
According to the theoretical model, the ratio of one’s own income to the marriage ideal 
should affect the marriage decision, but only for those below the ideal.  The preferred 
specification is as follows: 
12 3
4
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where Pr( ) i mar is the probability individual i is married,  i Under  is an indicator 





is the ratio of i's income to the ideal,  i X  is 
a vector of individual characteristics,  ycat γ  is a vector of dummies indicating income 
categories adjusted for cost-of-living (corresponding to the year-specific percentile rank 
in the national housing-price adjusted income distribution),  yrank α  is a vector of dummies 
indicating the individual’s decile income rank in his metropolitan area (within-
race/ethnicity group),  age σ   represents individual age dummies,   educyr ∂  represents 
education group-year dummies,  metro θ  indicates metropolitan area fixed effects and εi is an 
error term.
17   The key coefficients are 1 β  , the effect of the ratio for those under the ideal, 
and 2 β , the effect of the ratio for those above the ideal.  The theoretical framework 
predicts that  1 β  is positive and  2 β is zero. 
 
In the preferred specification, we control for income quite flexibly.  A dummy for each 
percentile group of the national cost-of-living adjusted income distribution in each year is 
included in the model, for a total of 300 categories.
18  Our models include a number of 
other individual level control variables.  Four education categories are included – less 
                                                 
17 The equations are estimated using the linear probability model for ease of interpretation.  The main 
results are qualitatively similar if one uses probit models instead. 
18 The cost-of-living adjustment is calculated using the formula suggested by Albouy (2008), which 
weights housing-related prices using a 0.36 share of expenditures.  Alternative adjustments are used in the 
sensitivity analysis.   16
than high school, high school exactly, some college, and college graduate or more – and 
interacted with year dummies so that the effect of education is allowed to vary over time.  
Individual age dummies and indicators for the man’s employment status and whether he 
is employed full-time full-year are also included.  The preferred specifications 
incorporate dummies for the individual’s decile rank in the metropolitan area. 
 
We incorporate a rich set of metropolitan area control variables as well.  All models 
include metropolitan area fixed effects to account for unobserved characteristics of cities 
that do not change over time.  We also control for demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics of the metropolitan residents – fraction native black, fraction native 
Hispanic, fraction foreign-born, fraction with a high school degree, fraction with some 
college, fraction with a college degree or more, fraction under 18, and fraction under 65.  
We control for the male employment-to-population ratio and predicted male and female 
employment levels based on 1980 industrial mix.  We include additional controls for the 
race/ethnicity specific sex ratios in the metropolitan area, the ACCRA housing price 
index, the log of real housing-price-adjusted AFDC/TANF benefits for a family of three 
in the state, and the log of the metropolitan area population.
19 
 
Because we control very flexibly for individual income and metropolitan area fixed 
effects, the key source of variation stems from a man’s relative income – how his income 
relates to the marriage ideal determined by his reference group.  We hypothesize that a 
low-income man is less likely to marry if he lives in a metropolitan area with high-
income men, holding his own income and income rank constant.  A sufficiently high-
income man, on the other hand, is unaffected by others being rich in his reference group.  
 
Table 4 shows means for each of the three samples.  After excluding the top and bottom 5 
percent of the national income distribution, those living in group quarters, and those in 
excluded metropolitan areas, the final sample of native non-Hispanic white men is 1.16 
million observations.  For black men, the final sample size is roughly 143,000 and for 
                                                 
19 The welfare benefits data are from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research state-level 
transfer program information, available at www.ukcpr.org.   17
Hispanic men the sample is about 67,000.
20   The marriage rate fell by about 15 
percentage points between 1980 and 2000 for both the white sample and the black 
sample; the Hispanic sample experienced larger declines in marriage.  Rates of marriage 
are lowest and rates of cohabitation are highest for the black sample.  For all three 
samples, the average income of sample men remained stable or declined.
21  
 
V.  Results 
A. Analysis of Native Born Non-Hispanic White Men 
The model suggests that relative income matters to the marriage decision.  In particular, a 
man is more likely to marry when his income approaches a marriage ideal.  The ratio of 
income to the ideal is expected to predict marital status below the ideal, but not above the 
ideal.   
 
Our results are foreshadowed by Figure 4.  Here we divide the white sample into 
categories based on the ratio of each man’s income to the theoretical marriage ideal.  In 
each Census year, the probability of marriage is sharply increasing with the ratio to the 
ideal until a ratio of 1.0 to 1.3.  Above 1.3, the relationship between the ratio and 
marriage is flat.  This pattern is consistent with the predictions of the model.  Of course, 
there are many other factors that could be contributing to the observed relationship 
between the ratio to the ideal and marriage, including non-linearities in the income-
marriage relationship. We turn to regression analysis to isolate the effect of relative 
income.  
 
In Table 5, we examine the relative income hypothesis in a linear probability model.  
Column I indicates that a man’s absolute income is strongly related to his marital status.  
An additional log point of income raises the probability of being married by 17 
percentage points, holding many individual and metropolitan area characteristics 
constant.  This result is consistent with the large literature suggesting that absolute 
income is an important predictor of marriage.  Column II of Table 5 indicates that, 
                                                 
20 The previous section describes sample restrictions for the black and Hispanic samples.  The samples 
include fewer metropolitan areas and exclude the top and bottom ten percent of the income distributions. 
21 As discussed in the appendix, estimated potential earnings of women increased substantially.   18
controlling log-linearly for his own income, a man is 4.4 percentage points less likely to 
be married if his income falls below the marriage ideal.   
 
The theoretical framework implies that is the ratio of income to the ideal that affects 
marital status.  As shown in column III, the ratio of a man’s own income to the ideal has 
a highly significant relationship to marriage below the ideal.  The ratio between income 
and the ideal is also statistically significant for men above the ideal, but the coefficient is 
much smaller.   
 
The evidence in the first three columns is consistent with the idea that relative income is 
important, but could also reflect an underlying non-linear relationship between income 
and marriage.  We prefer a more flexible specification.  We create 100 dummy variables 
for each year corresponding to income percentile groups of the national income 
distribution.
22  Incorporating the nearly 300 income dummy variables into the model, we 
find results that are highly consistent with the theoretical predictions.  Column IV of 
Table 5 shows that the ratio to the ideal significantly affects the probability of marriage 
below the ideal, but not above ideal.  In column V, we add 9 dummies indicating the 
decile rank category in the metropolitan area and the results hold.    
 
We prefer the model in column V of Table 5 because it is conservative.  We flexibly 
account for both absolute income and metropolitan area rank.  The magnitude of the 
coefficient suggests that moving one’s income from the 70
 to 80 percent of the marriage 
ideal, for example, increases the probability of marriage by 2.4 percentage points.  In 
contrast, moving from 120 to 130 percent of the ideal increases marriage by less than 0.1 
percentage point, and the effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  We refer to 
the model in column V as our baseline model. 
 
We next allow the effect of the ratio to vary by income decile rank in the metropolitan 
area (controlling for the direct effect of decile rank and controlling flexibly for absolute 
income).   The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 5.  The effect of the ratio to 
                                                 
22 The distribution accounts for cost-of-living differences across metropolitan areas.   19
the marriage ideal is statistically significant in the second through seventh deciles and 
peaks in the third decile.  As noted above, roughly 70 percent of the sample lies below 
the marriage ideal, so these results are highly consistent with the model.  The absence of 
an effect for the bottom decile may reflect measurement error and the smaller sample 
size, or may indicate that the behavior of the bottom decile individuals is not affected by 
a middle class reference group.
23 
 
The baseline model is consistent with the theory outlined above, in which we expect the 
effect of relative income to depend on where an individual stands relative to an ideal.  In 
the appendix, we consider an alternative specification, which considers the relationship 
between the level of the ideal and marital status, conditional on own income.
24  Results 
using this alternative approach are shown in Appendix Table 1.  A higher middle class 
ideal is indeed associated with a lower probability of marriage. After controlling for 
absolute income (column IV), a 10 percent higher marriage ideal is associated with a 1.1 
percentage point lower probability of marriage for those below the ideal (conditional on 
own income). There is no relationship between the level of the ideal and marital status for 
those above the ideal.  A decile-by-decile analysis shows that the significant effects of a 
rise in the marriage ideal occur in the fourth and fifth deciles (Appendix  Figure  1).    
Although the results using the alternative specification are largely consistent with those 
from our baseline model, the baseline specification is more robust and more closely 
aligned with our theoretical framework.  We therefore proceed using the baseline model. 
 
In sum, for young white men, relative income is linked to marital status for those below 
the middle class marriage ideal, but not for those above the ideal.  The association is 
robust to the inclusion of flexible controls for absolute income and rank.  We now 
consider education-group-specific reference groups. 
 
                                                 
23 Recall that the bottom five percent of the distribution is dropped from the analysis. 
24 This approach is analogous to that used in Luttmer (2005), in which a reference group’s average income 
determines happiness, conditional on own income.   20
B.  Education-Based Reference Groups 
In the baseline model, we define reference groups based on race and ethnicity because 
these groups appear to be highly relevant for marriage markets.  However, marriage 
norms may be derived based on different reference groups - for example, within 
education groups or within race/ethnicity and education groups.   
 
In Appendix Table 2, we consider three possible reference groups for the analysis of 
white men:  within race/ethnicity group, within education group, and within 
race/ethnicity and education group.  All reference groups are defined within metropolitan 
areas.  We use the preferred specification which controls flexibly for income and rank.  
Overall, the race/ethnicity based reference group yields results that most closely align 
with the predictions of the theoretical framework. 
 
We also examine the reference groups separately for men of different education levels. 
The baseline reference group (defined by metropolitan area and race/ethnicity) performs 
well for three of four education groups.  The results are consistent with the model for 
men with less than high school, high school exactly, and some college.   The non-college-
graduates appear to base marriage decisions, in part, on how their earnings compare to 
those of other white workers in the metropolitan area.  Using education and 
race/ethnicity-specific reference groups also generate results that are consistent with the 
theoretical framework. 
 
For college graduates, the baseline specification offers results that are only marginally 
consistent with the model.  The within-race within-education group specification is an 
improvement.  It appears that white college graduates refer to other white college 
graduates to define the marriage ideal.    
   
C.  Results for Black and Hispanic Men 
Of particular policy concern is the low rate of marriage among disadvantaged minorities.  
The first columns of Table 6 repeat the baseline analyses for native non-Hispanic black 
men.  As shown in column I, the ratio of income to the ideal does increase the odds of   21
marriage for black men below the ideal.  However, to a lesser extent, it also increases the 
odds of marriage for those above the ideal.  Thus, the results are less consistent with the 
theoretical framework than for the white sample.  This is true using both the one-earner 
and two-earner methodologies (see Appendix Table 4). 
 
It may be the case that black men or couples look beyond the black community as they 
derive norms about the level of income required for marriage.
25  We explore three 
potential reference groups:  within race/ethnicity group, within education group, and 
within race/ethnicity and education group. All three reference groups appear to have 
some relevance – the slope is higher under the ideal than over the ideal in all three cases. 
Using the education group as the reference group offers results which have the most 
significant difference between the under and over coefficients, and is the only 
specification which has an insignificant effect of the ratio above the ideal as predicted by 
the model.  For black men, the education-based reference group generates results which 
are most consistent with the theoretical framework, and it is the preferred specification 
for this sample. 
 
Table 6 also reports results for Hispanic men.  For the Hispanic sample, the race/ethnicity 
specific reference group performs well.  Hispanic men exhibit a link between relative 
income and marriage, but only when their earnings lie below a middle class ideal defined 
by the earnings of other Hispanic men. 
   
D.  Cohabitation and Fatherhood 
Our theoretical framework is motivated by qualitative work suggesting that some couples 
defer marriage even when already living together with children.  Here we explore 
whether the relative income effects are evident among cohabiting couples and cohabiting 
couples with children.  Because search considerations are likely to be dampened for 
                                                 
25 Alternatively, it is possible that the 50
th percentile is an inappropriate benchmark.  Empirical analysis 
suggests that other benchmarks do not perform significantly better (analysis not shown).   We also examine 
whether the race/ethnicity-based reference group has more salience in more highly segregated metropolitan 
areas.  While we do find some suggestion that this is the case, the results are fragile and we do not present 
them here. 
   22
cohabiting couples, this exercise helps us to isolate the effect of relative income on the 
marriage decision, conditional on a partnership.
26  It also allows us examine whether the 
effect of relative income on marriage appears to stem from declines in cohabitation or 
declines in men living alone (not co-residing with a partner), and whether relative income 
drives co-residential fatherhood. 
 
There are several limitations to this analysis.  First, for unmarried men, a cohabiting 
relationship can only be observed in the Census if the man or his partner is the household 
head.  We limit the analysis in this section to men who are household heads or have 
partners or spouses who are household heads (the household head sample).  This 
introduces selection bias to the extent that the decision to form a separate household is 
linked to the decision to co-reside with a partner.  In addition, the 1980 Census does not 
distinguish between unmarried partners and roommates.  For consistency, we define an 
unmarried man as cohabiting if he has either a female roommate or an unmarried partner 
in all three Census years.
27  
 
Further complications arise in evaluating the decision to have children.  A man is listed as 
having children in the household if he lives with his own children or his step-children; the 
latter label is endogenous to the marriage decision.  Also, it is not possible to observe 
fatherhood if the man does not live in the same household as is children.  Our solution is 
to describe the man as living with children if he lives with a female partner who has 
children (regardless of whether they are described as his own). Because non-residential 
fatherhood is unobservable, the outcome observed is co-residential fatherhood. 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the cohabitation and fatherhood analysis.  All regressions 
use the one-earner methodology and the preferred baseline specification which includes 
dummy variables for absolute income and decile rank.  The reference group is defined by 
race/ethnicity for the white sample and defined by education for the black sample.   
 
                                                 
26 Of course, partner search may continue within the context of cohabitation and marriage.   
27 In the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, roughly three quarters of cohabiting men are living with unmarried 
partners rather than female roommates.   23
The results for the white household head sample are shown in the first four columns of 
Panel A of Table 7. Restricting to household heads reduces the white male sample size by 
about 15 percent.  As seen in the first column, the baseline effect of relative income on 
marriage is substantially weaker than when using the full sample (column V of Table 5), 
though still significant at the 10 percent level.
28  The second and third columns of Table 7 
suggest that the increase in marriage due to relative income is associated with a 
commensurate decline in living alone.  There is no effect of relative income on unmarried 
cohabitation in the white sample.   
 
Columns V and VI of Table 7 further restrict the sample to a subsample of couples who 
live together.  Within couples that co-reside (either in cohabitation or marriage), there is 
no strong effect of relative income on marriage, as shown in column V.  Furthermore, 
there is no effect of relative income on marriage among couples that already co-reside 
with children (column VII).  Taken together, the results for the white sample suggest that 




We also examine the effect of relative income on the fatherhood decision (or, more 
accurately, the decision to co-reside with children). In columns IV and VI it is evident 
that the decision to co-reside with kids follows a similar pattern to the pattern for 
marriage; this is the case whether one considers all men or just those who live with a 
partner.  The ratio of income to the marriage ideal is a strong predictor of co-residential 
fatherhood below the ideal and much less so above the ideal.  In sum, the evidence 
suggests that reaching the “marriage ideal” jointly spurs co-residence, marriage, and 
children among white men.  This is the case even among less educated white men (results 
not shown). 
 
                                                 
28 This decline in effect size may indicate that some of the effect of relative income on marriage arises 
along with formation of independent households. 
29 These models include controls for race/ethnicity-specific sex ratios in the metropolitan area and dummies 
indicating decile rank in the local race/ethnicity-specific income distribution.  Nevertheless, because non-
co-residential partnerships are unobserved, we cannot rule out the possibility that search or marriage market 
considerations are driving the relationship between relative income and marriage for this group.   24
The pattern is substantially different for black men, as shown in Panel B of Table 7.  
About 40 percent of the sample is lost when we restrict to household heads, but the 
results are qualitatively similar to the preferred specification (reported in column II of 
Table 6).  Panel B of Table 7 indicates that, in contrast to the white sample, the effect of 
relative income on marriage is associated with a large decline in cohabitation for black 
men (see column II).  Higher relative income is associated with marriage among low-
income black men who would otherwise be cohabiting.  Furthermore, among co-residing 
couples, higher relative income is associated with a higher likelihood of marriage for 
those below the marriage ideal (see column V).  Marriage is linked to relative income 
considerations even among co-residing couples with children, as shown in column VII.   
 
As is evident in columns IV and VI, the decision to co-reside with children or to have 
children within the context of a co-residential relationship is not related to the ratio 
variables for black men.  For black men, the decision to live with a partner (in marriage 
or cohabitation) and to be a co-residential father appears to be largely independent of 
relative income considerations.  However, the decision to marry depends on the ratio of 
income to the ideal for those below the ideal, even among those already co-residing with 
a partner and children.  The results suggest that relative income affects the decision to 
marry, conditional on choosing a particular partner.  
 
We perform a similar analysis for Hispanic men (not shown).  These men appear to 
exhibit patterns that fall somewhat in between white and black men.  However, the 
standard errors are large and we cannot say anything definitive. 
 
In sum, relative income is linked to the decision to marry among white and black men.  
Among white men, the decisions to live with a partner and to have children are also 
affected by relative income, perhaps because co-residence, marriage, and childbearing are 
fairly tightly linked.  For black men, this is not the case.  Relative income does not appear 
to affect the decision to co-reside or to be a co-resident father.  Relative income does, 
however, affect the decision to marry, even among those living with their partner and 
children.     25
 
E. Robustness 
In this sub-section we assess the robustness of our results to a variety of specifications.  
The analysis is presented in Table 8, with the baseline analysis in column I.  For the black 
sample, we present the sensitivity analysis using the education-based reference group.  
However, results are also consistent with the baseline when using the race/ethnicity-based 
reference group for the black sample (not shown).    
 
First, we consider the dependent variable.  In the main specification individuals are 
defined as married if they are currently married and living with their spouse.  In column 
II, we use the category “ever married” as the dependent variable.  Our model speaks to 
the decision to marry rather than to the decision to remain married, so it is unsurprising 
that the results are not substantially changed.
30  We also see in column III that the divorce 
decision is unaffected by relative income considerations of the type explored here.
31 
 
Next, we examine the role of housing prices.  In the baseline, we adjust for cost-of-living 
differences by assuming 0.36 of expenditures are affected by housing prices, as suggested 
by Albouy (2008).  However, it is possible that the adjustment does not accurately reflect 
differences in cost-of-living, implying that the identified effect could result from absolute 
rather than relative income.  In column IV we try an unadjusted measure of income and 
in column V we use an expenditure share of 0.5.   In column VI, we drop the control for 
the housing price index.  None of these alternative approaches to accounting for housing 
price differentials across metropolitan areas make a substantive difference to the results. 
 
In column VII, we run the regressions without excluding the tails of the income 
distribution.  When the top and bottom five percent of the income distribution are 
included, the white sample results are muted but retain their significance.  We suspect the 
                                                 
30 An exception is that the results for the Hispanic sample are sensitive to the ever-married and married 
distinction.  This might stem from men who live apart from their spouses, who are considered ever married 
but not married now according to our definitions. 
31 Given that the sample is comprised of young men, divorce is an uncommon outcome.  Relative income 
considerations could affect the divorce decision more generally.   26
weaker results stem from measurement error and top- and bottom-coding.  The results for 
the black and Hispanic samples are largely unchanged when the tails are included. 
 
The next columns address the issue that rising male wage inequality may induce a longer 
search period for women in the marriage market, as posited by Loughran (2002) and 
Gould and Paserman (2003).  Following Gould and Paserman (2003), we use the standard 
deviation of log real weekly male wages as an index of inequality.  Controlling for 
inequality in column VIII does not change our results.  We also try interacting the 
inequality measure with an indicator for being below the marriage ideal and our results 
are unchanged, as shown in column IX.   
 
In column X we include a more extensive set of rank dummies – one for each percentile 
of the within-race/ethnicity within-metropolitan area income distribution.  This does 
weaken the results for the white sample.  The results for the black sample and Hispanic 
samples retain their significance. 
 
As a final robustness check presented in the table, column XI uses a probit model.   
Marginal effects are displayed and are quite similar to the baseline coefficients.  
 
We also try additional robustness checks not presented here.  We allow the effects of 
individual age dummies to vary by year.  We control for income linearly in a 
specification which also includes income categories.  We randomly split the sample into 
two sets of metropolitan areas.  The results are consistent with the preferred 
specifications in all cases. 
 
F.  Extensions 
In the appendix, we discuss two extensions.  First, we incorporate women’s earnings into 
the model.  The alternative marriage bars using this approach are shown in Appendix 
Table 3.  The results of the analysis incorporating potential female earnings are similar to 
the baseline analysis (see Appendix Table 4).  Income is a strong predictor of marriage   27
when a couple’s potential earnings lies below a middle class ideal, and income is less 
closely tied to marriage above the ideal. 
 
In the appendix we also extend the length of the analysis by incorporating data from the 
1% Public Use Microdata Sample of the 1970 Census.  Incorporating the 1970 data 
requires changing the analysis slightly:  the number of metropolitan areas is reduced, 
income is not adjusted for housing price differences across metropolitan areas, and some 
control variables are unavailable.  Nevertheless, the results are highly consistent with 
those from the main analysis.  The results of the 1970-2000 analysis are reported in 
Appendix Table 5.    
 
VI.  Simulations 
The relationship between relative income and marriage is quite robust.  However, it is 
difficult to gauge the importance of the effects by looking at the coefficients.  To what 
extent do relative income considerations explain the steep decline in marriage rates in 
recent decades or the roughly 30 percentage point marriage gap between high- and low- 
income men?  Here we use the models generated using 1970-2000 data to assess the 
magnitude of relative income effects.
32   
 
The first simulation uses the 1970-2000 analyses (shown in Appendix Table 5) to predict 
what would have happened if the ratios of income to ideal income maintained their 1970 
values (allowing absolute income to change as it actually did).  Within each sample, we 
calculate the average position above/below the bar and ratio variables for each decile 
rank in each metropolitan area in 1970.  We then predict the probability of marriage 
assuming those variables maintained their 1970 levels throughout the sample for men in a 
given decile rank and metropolitan area.  The resulting values are reported by income 
quartile in Table 9.   
 
                                                 
32 Results are similar if we use the baseline 1980-2000 model from Table 5.  However, using the 1970-2000 
analysis allows us to examine the importance of relative income in marriage declines since 1970.  Note that 
the 1970 analysis includes fewer metropolitan areas and excludes some controls and adjustments for 
housing prices.   We perform the simulations for the native white and native black samples only.   28
The simulations suggest that about 3 percentage points of the 30-point decline in white 
marriage rates since 1970 can be attributed to relative income considerations.  The effect 
is largest in the bottom quartiles, where 12 to 14 percent of the decline in marriage can be 
explained.  The simulations suggest that marriage rates would be about four percentage 
points higher for low-income white men if relative income maintained its 1970 levels, 
holding absolute income constant.    
 
For the native non-Hispanic black sample, the simulation uses education-specific 
reference groups to determine the relevant marriage ideal.  Within education groups, 
relative income did not change much between 1970 and 2000 for black men.  Therefore, 
the holding relative income constant at 1970 levels does little to explain falling marriage 
rates among blacks.
33    
 
The second simulation examines the hypothetical impact of eliminating relative income 
considerations altogether.
34  In the second simulation, we allow each individual to 
maintain their position over or under the ideal, but set the relevant ratio variable to a 
value of one.  This thought exercise is equivalent to imagining that each individual sets 
his ideal income at his actual income, holding his actual income constant. 
 
The simulated marriage rates imply that relative income considerations are an important 
determinant of marriage.   Aggregate rates would be 9-10 percentage points higher for 
both white and black men in the year 2000 if relative income did not affect the marriage 
decision; rates for the bottom quartile of men would be 20 percentage points higher.  
Furthermore, relative income considerations explain more than half of the marriage gap 
between high- and low- income men in every Census year.   
 
In conclusion, relative income appears to be strongly related to marriage rates.   
Simulations based on regression models imply that marriage rates would be 20 
                                                 
33 The model using race/ethnicity-specific reference groups implies that black marriage rates would be 
about 8 percent (3 percentage points) higher if relative income was held at 1970 levels. 
34 To calculate a “marriage gap” between high- and low-income men, we subtract the marriage rate of 
bottom quartile men from the rate of top quartile men, where quartiles are defined within metropolitan 
areas.   29
percentage points higher for white and black low-income men if marriage ideals were 
aligned with actual incomes, holding actual incomes fixed.    Declining relative incomes 
for low-income white men explain 10-15 percent of the decline in marriage since 1970.   
 
VII. Conclusions 
Based on the analysis presented here, we conclude that relative income is an important 
determinant of the marriage decision.  A man’s “marriageability” appears to be related 
not only to his absolute level of income, but to income relative to an ideal level 
determined by a local reference group.  Relative income concerns drive 10-15 percent of 
the decline in marriage for low income white men, and account for half of the persistent 
gap in marriage between high- and low-income men.   
 
There are multiple potential explanations for the robust association between relative 
income and marriage.  Here we present one theoretical framework - a model of identity - 
that generates predictions consistent with the empirical patterns.   Among black men, 
relative income predicts marital status even among those who live with partners and 
children.  This result is hard to reconcile with traditional economic models of the 
marriage decision.  The identity model is also corroborated by previous qualitative work.   
 
One possibility we have not explored is that the financial ideal associated with marriage 
may be endogenous to marriage rates.  As marriage becomes more rarefied and the 
financial gap between married and unmarried couples widens, the marriage ideal may 
increase.  The resulting cycle is difficult to identify empirically, but suggests the role of 
relative income may be understated here.   
 
Finally, we note that while marriage has been proposed as an anti-poverty measure, our 
results imply that anti-poverty (or, more precisely, anti-inequality) measures may 
increase marriage rates.  On the other hand, as long as it remains difficult for low-income 
couples to “keep up with the Joneses,” the evidence suggests that these couples are likely 
to defer marriage until their high financial expectations are reached.   30
VIII.  Appendix 
A.  An Alternative Model 
The baseline model is consistent with the theory outlined above, in which we expect the 
effect of relative income to depend on where an individual stands relative to an ideal.  
However, it is also possible to examine the effect of the ideal on marriage directly, 




Pr( ) * * *(1 )*
*
ideal ideal ii i
i ycat yrank age educyr metro i
mar under Y under Y
X
ββ
βγ α σ θ ε
=+ − +
++ ++ ∂+ +
 
In Appendix Table 1, we use the alternative specification to examine the effect of the 
marriage ideal on the probability of marriage.  A higher middle class ideal is indeed 
associated with a lower probability of marriage; a 10 percent higher median income is 
associated with a 1.5 percentage point lower marriage rate.  After controlling flexibly for 
absolute income (see column IV), a 10 percent higher marriage ideal is associated with a 
1.1 percentage point lower probability of marriage for those below the ideal.  There is no 
significant effect of the ideal for those above the ideal.  Using this alternative model, we 
cannot identify any significant effects after controlling for decile rank (column V).   
However, a decile-by-decile analysis (Appendix Figure 1) indicates that there are 
significant effects of a higher marriage ideal occur in the fourth and fifth deciles.  The 
effect for the bottom decile is wrong-signed.
35   
 
B.  Results by Education Group 
Appendix Table 2 explores results stratified by education group for the white male 
sample.  As is evident from the first column, the specification using a race/ethnicity-
specific reference group offers the best fit for all men.  The remaining columns stratify 
results by four education categories – less than high school, high school exactly, some 
college, and college graduate or more.  The race/ethnicity-specific reference group 
performs well for all categories except college graduates.  The marriage decisions of 
                                                 
35 This may be due to measurement error.  For example, some of the men in the bottom decile might have 
low income because they were in school, starting a business, or unemployed in the previous year.  High 
median earnings in an area may be correlated with income at the time of the marriage decision.   31
white college graduates appear to be responsive to the incomes of other white college 
graduates – that is, a race/ethnicity and education-specific reference group.   
 
Results for the non-white samples using different reference groups are discussed in the 
main text.  We do not have the statistical power to stratify results by education for the 
non-white samples.      
 
C.  Incorporating Women’s Earnings 
Our theoretical model abstracts from the issue of women’s earnings.  However, the 
potential earnings of the couple relative to other couples may be important in the 
marriage decision.  It is challenging to estimate a couple’s combined earnings for two 
reasons.  First, in the case of an unmarried man, we often do not know the characteristics 
of his partner or potential partner.
36  Second, labor supply is endogenous to the marriage 
decision.  To generate estimates of combined earnings, it is necessary to make strong 
assumptions about the matching process and about female potential earnings.  For the 




To estimate that potential earnings of men’s mates, we use the Census sample of 23-32 
year-old women.
38  We discard women who are married with children on the grounds that 
their earnings are particularly unlikely to approximate potential earnings.  Then, we rank 
each woman within metropolitan area and race/ethnicity group on the basis of her total 
real income last year.   Finally, we assume positive assortative mating of a particular 
form:  every man is matched to an average woman of his same decile rank in the 
metropolitan area-race/ethnicity income distribution.
39   Implicitly, we assume that men 
are matched to a partner in their own race/ethnicity group.  This is a reasonable 
                                                 
36 Men’s partners can only be observed if they are living in the same household and one member of the 
partnership is the head of the household.  Furthermore, in 1980, one cannot distinguish an unmarried 
partner from a female roommate in the data.   
37 A long literature debates whether married men receive a premium in the labor market.  See Antonovics 
and Town (2004) for recent evidence of a causal effect of marriage on wages, for example. 
38 We use a younger group because on average women are younger than their husbands. 
39 Although we control for race/ethnicity specific sex ratios in the empirical analysis, we ignore unbalanced 
sex ratios for the purposes of our matching algorithm.    32
approximation for native born whites and native born blacks, though not for native born 
Hispanics.
40  The incomes of sample “couples” are constructed using the actual male 
earnings and the estimated female potential earnings.   We drop observations with zero or 
negative estimated female earnings.
41    
 
We calculate middle class marriage ideals by combining income of male and female full-
time full-year workers in the reference group.  The means of these ideals are shown in 
Appendix Table 3.  They are increasing over time for all three groups, reflecting the rise 
in female earnings.  There is also rising inequality in couples’ earnings, reflected in the 
fact that ratios of income to the ideal are falling for those below the ideal and rising for 
those above the ideal. 
 
Appendix Table 4 shows the results of the two-earner analysis.    All regressions control 
flexibly for absolute income and metropolitan area rank. Columns I through III display 
the two-earner results for the sample of white men.  The ratio of (estimated) two-earner 
income to the two-earner marriage ideal is a significant determinant of marriage, and the 
effect is larger below the ideal.  For white men, the race/ethnicity-specific reference 
group generates results that are most consistent with the model.    There is a strong 
positive relationship between income and marital status below the ideal and a much 
weaker (though still significant) relationship above the ideal. 
 
As shown in columns IV to VI, the two-earner model is consistent with the theoretical 
framework for black men as well.  As is the case with the one-earner analysis, education-
specific marriage ideals perform well.    
 
For white and black men, the two earner model performs similarly to the one-earner 
model.  However, the two earner model does not perform well for Hispanic men, as seen 
in the final three columns of Appendix Table 4.  Given the large fraction of native 
                                                 
40 Among married native born white men in the sample, 93 to 96 percent are married to native born white 
women, depending on education group.  Among married native born black men, 85 to 94 percent are 
married to native born black women.  Among native born Hispanic men, 36 to 65 percent are married to 
native born Hispanic women (with another 15 to 17 percent marrying foreign born women).    
41 Dropping these observations makes little difference to the results.   33
Hispanic men who marry outside their race/ethnicity group, it is likely that imputed 
female potential earnings are particularly inaccurate for this group. 
 
D. 1970-2000 Analysis 
We extend the baseline analysis to incorporate 1970 data.  There are several limitations to 
the 1970-2000 analysis.  First, because local areas are less easily matched in IPUMS 
Census data prior to 1980, metropolitan area definitions are less consistent over time.  
There are also some metropolitan areas which are not available in 1970.  Second, reliable 
housing price data are not available in 1970.  Therefore income is not adjusted to reflect 
differences in the cost of living (except for those arising from general inflation at the 
national level).  Third, data on AFDC benefits are not readily available.  This control 
variable is excluded from the 1970 analysis.  
 
Results for white and black men are shown in Appendix Table 5.  The coefficients are 
similar to those in the baseline 1980-2000 analysis.  The ratio of income to the ideal is a 
strong predictor of marriage below the ideal, but not above the ideal.  The preferred ideal 
is determined by within-race reference groups for white men and by within-education 
reference groups for black men.  Given small sample sizes, we do not perform the 1970-
2000 analysis for the Hispanic sample.  34
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 Figure 1a.  Marriage Rates By Income,




















































Note:  Authors' calculations from U.S. Census.  Excludes men living in group quarters and in the top and bottom 5% of the income distribution.Figure 1b.  Marriage Rates By Income,



























































Note:  Authors' calculations from U.S. Census.  Excludes men living in group quarters and in the top and bottom 5% of the income distribution.Figure 1c.  Marriage Rates By Income,



























































Note:  Authors' calculations from U.S. Census.  Excludes men living in group quarters and in the top and bottom 5% of the income distribution.  Rates not shown for 1950 due to small sample sizes.Table 1.  Fraction of 25-to-34-Year-Old Men Married by Income Quartile, 1950-2000











1 0.59 0.67 0.65 0.49 0.39 0.34 -0.25 0.42 -0.15 0.31
2 0.78 0.83 0.82 0.68 0.57 0.51 -0.27 0.34 -0.16 0.24
3 0.85 0.88 0.87 0.75 0.65 0.60 -0.25 0.30 -0.16 0.21
4 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.81 0.72 0.67 -0.20 0.23 -0.14 0.17
All 0.77 0.82 0.81 0.68 0.58 0.53 -0.24 0.31 -0.15 0.22
Native Non-Hispanic Black
Quartile
1 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.27 0.14 0.16 -0.36 0.69 -0.11 0.39
2 0.63 0.71 0.70 0.47 0.25 0.29 -0.34 0.54 -0.18 0.38
3 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.59 0.44 0.43 -0.30 0.41 -0.16 0.27
4 0.74 0.81 0.81 0.67 0.54 0.50 -0.24 0.32 -0.17 0.25
All 0.66 0.70 0.69 0.50 0.34 0.35 -0.31 0.47 -0.15 0.31
Native Hispanic
Quartile
1 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.48 0.29 0.24 -0.36 0.59 -0.24 0.49
2 0.78 0.83 0.85 0.64 0.48 0.42 -0.36 0.46 -0.22 0.34
3 0.80 0.87 0.87 0.72 0.56 0.52 -0.28 0.35 -0.20 0.28
4 0.85 0.91 0.92 0.77 0.68 0.60 -0.25 0.30 -0.18 0.23
All 0.76 0.80 0.81 0.65 0.50 0.45 -0.31 0.41 -0.21 0.32
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Note:  Dashed lines indicate estimated ideals.
Solid lines indicate theoretical middle class ideals.
Figure 2.  Estimated and Theoretical Ideals
for Selected Metropolitan Areas
White Male SampleTable 2.  Marriage Ideals Using Different Reference Groups
White Sample (N=1,159,431) Black Sample (N=142,737) Hispanic Sample (N=67,480)
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Estimated Ideal (Metro-Year Break in Income-Marriage Relationship Within Race/Ethnicity)
Estimated Ideal Available 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.75 0.75 0.69 0.83 0.82 0.82
Estimated Ideal if Available ($2000) 41,972 43,044 43,898 34,633 32,361 34,703 35,825 37,480 33,317
Baseline Marriage Ideal, (Metro-Year Median FT Male Tot Income Within Race/Ethnicity)
Theoretical Middle Class Ideal ($2000) 45,282 45,723 46,476 32,117 32,153 32,784 35,115 34,821 32,884
Under Ideal 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.80 0.77 0.66 0.71 0.69
Ratio of Income to Ideal if Under 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.54 0.51 0.54 0.61 0.56 0.58
Ratio of Income to Ideal if Over 1.25 1.28 1.34 1.24 1.17 1.19 1.23 1.22 1.25
Within-Education Group Marriage Ideal, (Metro-Year Median FT Male Tot Income Within Education)
Theoretical Middle Class Ideal ($2000) 45,937 44,447 45,671 41,438 39,261 39,239 40,920 38,308 37,980
Under Ideal 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.90 0.93 0.89 0.79 0.78 0.78
Ratio of Income to Ideal if Under 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.60 0.56 0.57
Ratio of Income to Ideal if Over 1.26 1.31 1.35 1.12 1.13 1.17 1.19 1.24 1.26
Within-Education-Race Group Marriage Ideal, (Metro-Year Median FT Male Tot Income Within Education and Race/Ethnicity)
Theoretical Middle Class Ideal ($2000) 47,567 46,554 48,825 33,077 32,027 32,662 35,999 34,487 33,306
Under Ideal 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.82 0.78 0.69 0.72 0.70
Ratio of Income to Ideal if Under 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.55 0.52 0.55 0.62 0.58 0.60
Ratio of Income to Ideal if Over 1.24 1.28 1.31 1.23 1.20 1.21 1.23 1.26 1.28
Note:  Estimated ideal is the point of greatest flattening in income-marriage relationship within metropolitan area-year-race/ethnicity cell.  Theoretical ideal is median earnings of fully employed working 
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Figure 3.
Estimated and Theoretical Ideals
Across Metropolitan Areas
White Male SampleTable 3.  Determinants of Estimated Marriage Ideals Across Metropolitan Areas
Dependent Variable:  Log(Estimated Ideal) White Male Sample Black Male Sample
Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
1980 1990 2000 Effects Effects 1980 1990 2000 Effects Effects
Log (Theoretical Ideal) 1.4264** 1.6934** 1.1826** 1.0664** 1.6757** 1.0255** 0.2474 0.3847 1.0964 0.6091
(0.2467) (0.1925) (0.3027) (0.3290) (0.4822) (0.2210) (0.3241) (0.5093) (0.7263) (0.5846)
Log (Metropolitan Area Population) 0.0187 0.0765
(0.2269) (0.3817)
Race/Ethnicity Specific Sex Ratio 0.6142 -2.4970**
(1.4569) (0.8520)
Fraction High School 0.0614 2.8705
(1.0379) (3.4264)
Fraction Some College 2.0350 -3.0985
(1.6609) (5.0343)
Fraction College Grad -2.1062 0.9770
(1.6332) (3.6206)
Year is 1990 0.0068 -0.0772 -0.0006 0.1756
(0.0333) (0.1607) (0.1362) (0.5698)
Year is 2000 0.0052 -0.0334 0.0026 0.2530
(0.0374) (0.2329) (0.1134) (0.7310)
Metropolitan Area Dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 107 108 104 319 319 59 59 50 168 168
R-squared 0.38 0.57 0.34 0.73 0.74 0.33 0.02 0.02 0.60 0.71
Note:  Unit of observation is the metropolitan area-year.  Estimated ideal is the point of greatest flattening in income-marriage relationship within metropolitan area-year-
race/ethnicity cell.  Theoretical ideal is median earnings of fully employed working age men in reference group.  Observations with no estimated ideal are excluded.Table 4. Sample Means
White Sample (N=1,159,431) Black Sample (N=142,737) Hispanic Sample (N=67,480)
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Individual Characteristics
Married (and living with spouse) 0.65 0.56 0.50 0.49 0.34 0.33 0.63 0.48 0.43
Married Ever 0.76 0.66 0.59 0.67 0.48 0.46 0.77 0.62 0.54
Cohabiting (household head sample) 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.21 0.06 0.13 0.18
Residential Father (household head sample) 0.54 0.48 0.43 0.56 0.51 0.48 0.64 0.56 0.52
Male Total Income, $2000 36,943 36,071 37,119 23,621 20,380 22,559 28,686 26,166 25,923
Log(Estimated Female Potential Income), $2000 22,817 26,137 27,462 17,645 17,529 19,648 18,819 20,827 20,496
Age 29.30 29.54 29.68 29.11 29.37 29.55 28.95 29.08 29.10
Employed 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.80 0.80 0.78 0.88 0.88 0.83
Employed Full-Time Full-Year 0.72 0.74 0.77 0.54 0.56 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.64
High School Exactly 0.33 0.32 0.27 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.35 0.39 0.37
Some College 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.32 0.35 0.26 0.32 0.34
College Graduate or More 0.32 0.29 0.35 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.14
MSA Characteristics
MSA-Year Race/Ethnicity-Specific Sex Ratio 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.20 1.18 1.19 1.04 1.03 1.04
MSA-Year Fraction Black 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.09
MSA-Year Fraction Native Hispanic 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.16
MSA-Year Fraction Native Other 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
MSA-Year Fraction Immigrant 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.23
MSA-Year Fraction Under 18 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.27
MSA-Year Fraction Under 65 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.89
MSA-Year Fraction High School Exactly 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.27
MSA-Year Fraction Some College 0.17 0.26 0.28 0.16 0.25 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.28
MSA-Year Fraction College Grad 0.18 0.23 0.27 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.19 0.23 0.27
MSA-Year Male Emp.-to-Pop. Ratio (ages 18-64) 0.82 0.82 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.76
Male Predicted Employment Demand 0.66 0.60 0.60 0.66 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.61 0.61
Female Predicted Employment Demand 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.38 0.42 0.43 0.38 0.42 0.43
Housing Price Index 70.74 122.85 176.18 70.25 122.27 171.96 71.74 129.70 172.85
Real Housing-Price-Adjusted AFDC Benefit, $2000 782.11 597.83 424.68 700.99 540.03 383.12 821.84 658.04 476.16
Population 773,233 885,234 901,754 875,741 981,934 1,009,868 1,065,204 1,355,325 1,493,160
Notes:  White Sample refers to native non-Hispanic white men ages 25-34; Black sample refers to native non-Hispanic black men; Hispanic sample refers to native Hispanic men.  Means are for final samples which 
are restricted to 110, 85, and 47 metropolitan areas, for the white, black and Hispanic samples respectively.  White sample excludes top and bottom five percent of the income distribution in each area; Black sample 
and Hispanic samples exclude top and bottom ten percent.  Married Now refers to men married and living with a spouse.  Cohabition and residential fatherhood are based on subsamples of household heads and their 
partners; see text for details. Figure 4.  Ratio of Income to Ideal and Marriage,
















































1980 1990 2000 Note:  Ratios above 2.00 are excluded from figure.Table 5.  Effect of Ratio to Male Marriage Ideal on Marital Status, 
Native Born Non-Hispanic White Men Ages 25-34
Dependent Variable:  Married
(mean=0.572) I II III IV V
Ratio Income/Ideal if Under Marriage Ideal 0.4620** 0.3464** 0.2407**
(0.0191) (0.0476) (0.0564)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over Marriage Ideal 0.1120** 0.0302 0.0069
(0.0071) (0.0263) (0.0300)
Under Marriage Ideal -0.0439** -0.3380** -0.3041** -0.2229**
(0.0055) (0.0160) (0.0374) (0.0445)
Log (Real Total Income) 0.1727** 0.1522** -0.0291**
(0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0091)
Employed 0.0683** 0.0725** 0.0794** 0.0788** 0.0787**
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Employed Full Time Full Year 0.0473** 0.0502** 0.0444** 0.0427** 0.0426**
(0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029)
CMSA Sex Ratio (within race/ethnicity group) 0.4037** 0.4100** 0.4200** 0.4273** 0.4022**
(0.0973) (0.0940) (0.0768) (0.0821) (0.0807)
CMSA Housing Price Index -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Log (Real Adjusted AFDC Benefits) -0.0236+ -0.0233+ -0.0248* -0.0288* -0.0257*
(0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0125) (0.0121) (0.0120)
Decile Rank in CMSA-Race/Eth Group Dummies yes
Year-Specific Adjusted Income Dummies yes yes
Age Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Year*Ed Group Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Additional CMSA controls yes yes yes yes yes
CMSA Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 1159431 1159431 1159431 1159431 1159431
Number of CMSA-Year Cells 330 330 330 330 330
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate staistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively.  Regression 
sample excludes top and bottom 5 percent of income distribution in each metro area-year and those not living in households under the 1980 definition.  Additional 
CMSA controls include race/ethnicity distribution in CMSA (fraction native non-Hispanic black, fraction native Hispanic, fraction native non-Hispanic non-white 
non-black, fraction foreign born) , age distribution in CMSA (fraction under 18, fraction under 65), education distribution in CMSA (fraction high school exactly, 
fraction some college exactly, fraction college graduate or more), predicted employment demand for men, predicted employment demand for women, and log of 
population.  Education Groups include less than high school, high school exactly, some college, and college graduate or more.  Marriage Ideal defined as median 
income of full-time full-year male workers ages 18-64 in the CMSA-year-race/ethincity group. Adjusted income dummies reflect adjustment for cost of living as 
described in text.Figure 5.  Effect of Ratio of Income to Ideal on Marriage By Decile,
























Coefficient CI Bound CI BoundTable 6.  Effect of Ratio to Male Marriage Ideal on Marital Status, Black and Hispanic Men, Ages 25-34
Dependent Variable:  Married Now















I II III IV V VI
Ratio Income/Ideal if Under Marriage Ideal 0.2988** 0.2128** 0.1864** 0.2325* 0.3595** 0.2790**
(0.0640) (0.0469) (0.0302) (0.0874) (0.0518) (0.0442)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over Marriage Ideal 0.1596** -0.0171 0.0565* -0.0026 0.1726** 0.1282**
(0.0360) (0.0423) (0.0218) (0.0765) (0.0256) (0.0277)
Under Marriage Ideal -0.1319* -0.2310** -0.1378** -0.2198** -0.1632** -0.1584**
(0.0526) (0.0468) (0.0311) (0.0731) (0.0386) (0.0470)
Decile Rank in CMSA-Race/Eth Group Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-Specific Adjusted Income Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Age Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year*Ed Group Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional CMSA controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
CMSA Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 142737 142737 142737 67480 67480 67480
Number of CMSA-Year Cells 255 255 255 123 123 123
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate staistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively.  Regression sample excludes top and bottom 10 percent of 
income distribution in each metro area-year and those not living in households under the 1980 definition.  Marriage Ideal defined as median earnings of full-time full-year male workers ages 18-64 in the CMSA-
reference group. See Table 5 and text for more details.Table 7.  Effect of Ratio to Male Marriage Ideal on Cohabitation and Family Structure
I II III IV V VI VI
Panel A.  Native Non-Hispanic White Men
(Metro area and race/ethnicity define reference group.) Coresiding With Kids
Full Household Head Sample (N=977,732) Coresiding Sample (N=762,905) Sample (N=490,265)
Co-residing Co-residing
Dependent Variable: Married Cohabiting Non-Co-residing With Kids Married With Kids Married
(mean=0.679) (mean=0.091) (mean=0.229) (mean=0.488) (mean=0.882) (mean=0.663) (mean=0.963)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Under Marriage Ideal 0.0929+ 0.0051 -0.0996* 0.1770** -0.0360 0.1090* -0.0117
(0.0498) (0.0319) (0.0414) (0.0511) (0.0455) (0.0548) (0.0312)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over Marriage Ideal -0.0132 0.0397* -0.0272 0.0721* -0.0841* 0.0237 -0.0284
(0.0322) (0.0195) (0.0233) (0.0304) (0.0329) (0.0268) (0.0197)
Under Marriage Ideal -0.0954** 0.0302 0.0658* -0.0996** -0.0404 -0.0809+ -0.0142
(0.0349) (0.0235) (0.0272) (0.0378) (0.0306) (0.0411) (0.0164)
Panel B.  Native Non-Hispanic Black Men
(Metro area and education define reference group.) Coresiding With Kids
Full Household Head Sample (N=97,695) Coresiding Sample (N=70,741) Sample (N=51,561)
Co-residing Co-residing
Dependent Variable: Married Cohabiting Non-Coresiding With Kids Married With Kids Married
(mean=0.558) (mean=0.158) (mean=0.285) (mean=0.516) (mean=0.779) (mean=0.721) (mean=0.871)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Under Marriage Ideal 0.1083* -0.1309** 0.0217 0.0240 0.1094** 0.0066 0.0802*
(0.0422) (0.0277) (0.0444) (0.0398) (0.0366) (0.0384) (0.0351)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over Marriage Ideal -0.0009 -0.0298 0.0289 -0.0137 -0.0098 -0.0275 -0.0114
(0.0319) (0.0212) (0.0329) (0.0289) (0.0295) (0.0314) (0.0325)
Under Marriage Ideal -0.1116** 0.0983** 0.0123 -0.0354 -0.1141** -0.0225 -0.0991**
(0.0399) (0.0251) (0.0423) (0.0450) (0.0307) (0.0442) (0.0316)
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively.  Household head sample includes men reported as household heads or 
partners/roomates of female household heads.  Coresiding sample includes members of household head sample who are married or living with a partner or female roommate.  Coresiding with kids sample includes members 
of coresiding sample who have a partner with children living in the household.  Each column of a given panel represents a separate regression.  Regressions based on preferred specifications and include adjusted income 
category dummies, declie rank dummies, and all other controls.Table 8.  Sensitivity Analysis
I (Baseline) II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
Dependent Variable Married Ever Married Divorced Married Married Married Married Married Married Married Married
Housing Price Share of COL Adjustment 0.36 0.36 0.36 0 0.5 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
Housing Price Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tails Excluded Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controlling for Inequality No No No No No No No Yes No Yes No
Controlling for Inequality*Under Ideal No No No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Number of Rank Dummies 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 100 10
Econometric Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit
Panel A.  Native Non-Hispanic White Men
(Metro area and race/ethnicity define reference group.)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Under Marriage Ideal 0.2407** 0.1991** -0.0067 0.2305** 0.2657** 0.2228** 0.1358* 0.2418** 0.2317** 0.0814 0.1933**
(0.0564) (0.0495) (0.0109) (0.0601) (0.0561) (0.0520) (0.0539) (0.0559) (0.0551) (0.0647) (0.0518)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over Marriage Ideal 0.0069 -0.0440+ -0.0048 0.0123 0.0150 -0.0001 -0.0149** 0.0079 0.0055 -0.0670 0.0160
(0.0300) (0.0249) (0.0062) (0.0354) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0045) (0.0298) (0.0299) (0.0544) (0.0360)
Under Marriage Ideal -0.2229** -0.2338** 0.0032 -0.2109** -0.2399** -0.2121** -0.1422** -0.2230** -0.2529** -0.1324* -0.1641**
(0.0445) (0.0450) (0.0070) (0.0416) (0.0446) (0.0431) (0.0497) (0.0445) (0.0454) (0.0515) (0.0398)
Panel B.  Native Non-Hispanic Black Men
(Metro area and education define reference group.)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Under Marriage Ideal 0.2128** 0.2205** 0.0005 0.2067** 0.2120** 0.2132** 0.2505** 0.2143** 0.2123** 0.1968** 0.2173**
(0.0469) (0.0408) (0.0183) (0.0438) (0.0493) (0.0465) (0.0375) (0.0467) (0.0469) (0.0412) (0.0462)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over Marriage Ideal -0.0171 0.0190 0.0096 -0.0169 -0.0197 -0.0170 -0.0114+ -0.0164 -0.0177 -0.0340 -0.0056
(0.0423) (0.0412) (0.0140) (0.0403) (0.0441) (0.0422) (0.0064) (0.0423) (0.0421) (0.0424) (0.0422)
Under Marriage Ideal -0.2310** -0.2039** 0.0092 -0.2246** -0.2320** -0.2312** -0.2670** -0.2316** -0.2399** -0.2313** -0.2319**
(0.0468) (0.0434) (0.0214) (0.0454) (0.0472) (0.0467) (0.0331) (0.0468) (0.0474) (0.0477) (0.0482)
Panel C.  Native Hispanic Men
(Metro area and race/ethnicity define reference group.)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Under Marriage Ideal 0.2325* 0.0979 0.0068 0.2600** 0.2810** 0.2394** 0.2365** 0.2273* 0.2333* 0.1722+ 0.2102*
(0.0874) (0.1054) (0.0497) (0.0757) (0.0966) (0.0764) (0.0844) (0.0921) (0.0871) (0.0956) (0.1004)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over Marriage Ideal -0.0026 -0.0339 0.0257 0.0203 0.0210 0.0005 -0.0031 -0.0048 -0.0011 -0.0584 -0.0059
(0.0765) (0.0637) (0.0388) (0.0695) (0.0789) (0.0706) (0.0078) (0.0773) (0.0753) (0.0882) (0.0879)
Under Marriage Ideal -0.2198** -0.1146 0.0181 -0.2206** -0.2444** -0.2235** -0.2279** -0.2170** -0.2290** -0.2090* -0.1989*
(0.0731) (0.0803) (0.0403) (0.0572) (0.0744) (0.0734) (0.0821) (0.0759) (0.0839) (0.0832) (0.0792)
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively.  Each column within a panel represents a separate regression.  Regressions based on preferred 
specifications and include adjusted income category dummies, declie rank dummies, and all other controls.Table 9.  Simulation Results
Native Non-Hispanic White Sample Native Non-Hispanic Black Sample
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 All
Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Gap Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Gap
1970 0.64 0.79 0.86 0.89 0.80 0.25 1970 0.54 0.69 0.77 0.82 0.70 0.29
1980 0.44 0.61 0.73 0.79 0.65 0.35 1980 0.29 0.42 0.56 0.64 0.48 0.35
1990 0.34 0.51 0.63 0.73 0.55 0.38 1990 0.18 0.24 0.40 0.50 0.34 0.32
2000 0.31 0.46 0.58 0.66 0.50 0.35 2000 0.19 0.26 0.38 0.47 0.33 0.28
Change -0.34 -0.34 -0.29 -0.23 -0.30 Change -0.35 -0.43 -0.39 -0.35 -0.37
Simulation 1: Relative Income Fixed at 1970 Levels Simulation 1: Relative Income Fixed at 1970 Levels
Native Non-Hispanic White Sample Native Non-Hispanic Black Sample
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 All
Sim1 Sim1 Sim1 Sim1 Sim1 Sim1 Sim1 Sim1 Sim1 Sim1
1970 0.64 0.79 0.86 0.89 0.80 1970 0.54 0.69 0.77 0.82 0.70
1980 0.47 0.64 0.74 0.79 0.66 1980 0.29 0.42 0.56 0.64 0.48
1990 0.38 0.56 0.65 0.73 0.58 1990 0.18 0.24 0.40 0.50 0.34
2000 0.35 0.50 0.60 0.66 0.53 2000 0.19 0.26 0.38 0.47 0.33
Fraction Change Explained 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.01 0.09 Fraction Change Explained 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Simulation 2: Relative Income=1 Simulation 2: Relative Income=1
Native Non-Hispanic White Sample Fraction Native Non-Hispanic Black Sample Fraction
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 All Gap Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 All Gap
Sim 2 Sim 2 Sim 2 Sim 2 Sim 2 Explained Sim 2 Sim 2 Sim 2 Sim 2 Sim 2 Explained
1970 0.80 0.86 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.64 1970 0.70 0.78 0.83 0.84 0.79 0.49
1980 0.65 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.73 0.58 1980 0.50 0.55 0.63 0.66 0.59 0.55
1990 0.55 0.63 0.66 0.72 0.64 0.56 1990 0.39 0.40 0.49 0.53 0.45 0.55
2000 0.52 0.57 0.61 0.66 0.59 0.61 2000 0.39 0.40 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.62
Note:  Simulations use preferred specification for 1970-2000 analysis.  Q1-Q4 refer to income quartile in race/ethnicity-specific metropolitan area income ditribution.  See text for additional details.Appendix Table 1.  Effect of Marriage Ideal on Marital Status, Native Born Non-Hispanic White Men Ages 25-34
Dependent Variable:  Married
(mean=0.572) I II III IV V
Log (Marriage Ideal) -0.1492**
(0.0331)
Log (Marriage Ideal) if Under Ideal -0.1424** -0.1117** -0.0217
(0.0325) (0.0308) (0.0338)
Log (Marriage Ideal) if Over Ideal -0.0932* -0.0158 0.0123
(0.0424) (0.0388) (0.0355)
Under Marriage Ideal 0.4838+ 1.0297** 0.3714
(0.2899) (0.3069) (0.2810)
Log (Total Real Income) 0.1727** 0.1730** 0.1525**
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0063)
Decile Rank in CMSA-Race/Eth Group Dummies yes
Year-Specific Adjusted Income Dummies yes yes
Age Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Year*Ed Group Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Additional CMSA controls yes yes yes yes yes
CMSA Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 1159431 1159431 1159431 1159431 1159431
Number of CMSA-Year Cells 330 330 330 330 330
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate staistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively.  Marriage Ideal defined as median 
earnings of full-time full-year male workers ages 18-64 in the CMSA-year-race/ethincity group. See Table 5 notes and text for additional details.Appendix Figure 1.  Effect of Ratio of Marriage Ideal on Marriage By Decile,
























Coefficient CI Bound CI BoundAppendix Table 2.  Alternative Bars, By Education Group
Native Born Non-Hispanic White Men
Dependent Variable:  Married All Less Than HS HS Exactly Some College College Grad
Panel A.  Reference Group - Same Race/Ethnicity
Ratio Income/Ideal if Under Marriage Ideal 0.2407** 0.2172* 0.2027** 0.2187** 0.1047+
(0.0564) (0.1095) (0.0708) (0.0658) (0.0614)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over Marriage Ideal 0.0069 -0.0881 -0.0698* -0.0695+ 0.0128
(0.0300) (0.0665) (0.0342) (0.0397) (0.0296)
Under Marriage Ideal -0.2229** -0.3023** -0.2551** -0.2824** -0.0807
(0.0445) (0.0885) (0.0550) (0.0607) (0.0508)
Panel B.  Reference Group - Same Education
Ratio Income/Ideal if Under Marriage Ideal 0.3247** 0.0716 0.1862** 0.1185+ 0.0537
(0.0204) (0.0559) (0.0598) (0.0644) (0.0606)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over Marriage Ideal 0.1082** 0.0024 -0.0405+ -0.1134** -0.0946+
(0.0097) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0280) (0.0484)
Under Marriage Ideal -0.2152** -0.0540 -0.2057** -0.2188** -0.1436**
(0.0133) (0.0387) (0.0503) (0.0620) (0.0467)
Panel C.  Reference Group - Same Race/Ethnicity and Education
Ratio Income/Ideal if Under Marriage Ideal 0.3723** 0.1679* 0.2537** 0.1690* 0.1192*
(0.0171) (0.0671) (0.0645) (0.0664) (0.0542)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over Marriage Ideal 0.1215** -0.0459 -0.0654* -0.1259** -0.0561
(0.0113) (0.0430) (0.0292) (0.0305) (0.0504)
Under Marriage Ideal -0.2463** -0.1793** -0.2977** -0.2899** -0.1686**
(0.0135) (0.0565) (0.0622) (0.0670) (0.0395)
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively.  Each column of a given panel represents a separate 
regression.  Regressions based on preferred specifications and include adjusted income category dummies, declie rank dummies, and all other controls.Appendix Table 3.  Two-Earner Marriage Ideals Using Different Reference Groups
White Sample (N=1,159,431) Black Sample (N=142,737) Hispanic Sample (N=67,480)
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Baseline Two-Earner Marriage Ideal, (Metro-Year Median FT Combined Tot Income Within Race/Ethnicity)
Marriage Ideal ($2000) 70,849 75,713 79,469 55,306 58,370 60,897 57,546 60,997 60,036
Under Ideal 0.66 0.70 0.72 0.70 0.81 0.79 0.65 0.71 0.73
Ratio of Income to Ideal if Under 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.54 0.57 0.62 0.60 0.60
Ratio of Income to Ideal if Over 1.27 1.30 1.34 1.22 1.17 1.18 1.22 1.22 1.24
Within-Education Group Two-Earner Marriage Ideal, (Metro-Year Median FT CombinedTot Income Within Education)
Marriage Ideal ($2000) 73,307 74,681 78,466 66,321 66,277 67,888 65,983 65,902 66,815
Under Ideal 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.86 0.90 0.86 0.79 0.77 0.79
Ratio of Income to Ideal if Under 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.61 0.59 0.59
Ratio of Income to Ideal if Over 1.27 1.32 1.35 1.14 1.15 1.17 1.19 1.24 1.26
Within-Education-Race Group Two-Earner Marriage Ideal, (Metro-Year Median FT CombinedTot Income Within Education and Race/Ethnicity)
Marriage Ideal ($2000) 75,327 77,685 83,078 56,932 57,412 59,717 59,499 60,742 59,902
Under Ideal 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.81 0.79 0.69 0.72 0.72
Ratio of Income to Ideal if Under 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.57 0.55 0.58 0.63 0.61 0.61
Ratio of Income to Ideal if Over 1.25 1.29 1.31 1.23 1.20 1.22 1.22 1.25 1.27
Note:  Marriage ideal refers to income of fully employed 18-64 men plus income of fully employed 18-64 women in relevant reference group.  See appendix text for additional details.Appendix Table 4.  Two Earner Model
Dependent Variable:  Married








































I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Ratio Income/Ideal if Under Marriage Ideal 0.3645** 0.3475** 0.4074** 0.2270** 0.1808** 0.1418** 0.0653 0.2940** 0.2531**
(0.0637) (0.0233) (0.0179) (0.0470) (0.0371) (0.0318) (0.0867) (0.0487) (0.0534)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over Marriage Ideal 0.0670* 0.1254** 0.1491** 0.1646** -0.0060 0.0363+ -0.0717 0.1569** 0.1399**
(0.0338) (0.0116) (0.0106) (0.0392) (0.0296) (0.0216) (0.0980) (0.0289) (0.0319)
Under Marriage Ideal -0.2948** -0.2256** -0.2579** -0.0733 -0.1846** -0.1196** -0.1574 -0.1313** -0.1260*
(0.0483) (0.0141) (0.0130) (0.0474) (0.0424) (0.0284) (0.1008) (0.0326) (0.0478)
Decile Rank in CMSA-Race/Eth Group Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-Specific Adjusted Income Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Age Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year*Ed Group Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional CMSA controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
CMSA Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 1156094 1156094 1156094 142405 142405 142405 66929 66929 66929
Number of CMSA-Year Cells 330 330 330 255 255 255 123 123 123
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate staistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively.  See appendix text for additional details.Appendix Table 5.  1970-2000 Analysis
Dependent Variable:  Married



























I II III IV V VI
Ratio Income/Ideal if Under Marriage Ideal 0.2523** 0.3457** 0.3912** 0.1699** 0.2048** 0.1596**
(0.0603) (0.0245) (0.0240) (0.0495) (0.0408) (0.0321)
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over Marriage Ideal 0.0211 0.1117** 0.1258** 0.0747* 0.0172 0.0595*
(0.0350) (0.0124) (0.0135) (0.0367) (0.0379) (0.0235)
Under Marriage Ideal -0.2231** -0.2355** -0.2623** -0.0953* -0.1839** -0.1095**
(0.0420) (0.0143) (0.0158) (0.0435) (0.0428) (0.0318)
Decile Rank in CMSA-Race/Eth Group Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-Specific Adjusted Income Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Age Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year*Ed Group Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional CMSA controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
CMSA Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 1173124 1173124 1173124 145736 145736 145730
Number of CMSA-Year Cells 376 376 376 304 304 304
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate staistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively.  See appendix text for additional details.